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Abstract 
Shale gas has become an energy policy priority in the United Kingdom in light of profitable 
extraction activities in the United States. Since 2012, the UK Government has created key 
economic drivers to encourage shale exploration, whilst growing activism in affected site 
communities has stirred significant media and academic commentary. This study examines 
the growing national debate as a matter of discourse; adopting an argumentative discourse 
analytic approach to assess data collected from stakeholder interviews (n=21) and key policy 
actor statements quoted in broadsheet newspapers. We explore three dominant ‘storylines’ 
emerging in relation to shale gas policy. 1) “Cleanliness and dirt” concerns the relative 
framing of the environmental benefits and harms of shale gas; 2) “energy transitions – 
pathways and diversions” concerns geographic metaphors of transitions to carbon intensive 
and low-carbon energy systems; and 3) “geographies of environmental justice” concerns 
divisions of economic benefit distribution, environmental impact and procedural fairness. We 
find that central government policy rhetoric emphasises economic development, regulatory 
oversight and distribution of benefits to site communities, whilst minimising discussion of the 
implications of shale gas for anthropogenic climate change. The role of these discourses in 
influencing shale gas policy is discussed. 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The development of unconventional gas resources from organic shales has risen to the 
forefront of energy and environmental policy debates in the United Kingdom since 2011. 
Recent research and development of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking) 
techniques in the USA and Canada combined with rising fossil fuel prices, has led to the 
profitable expansion of global unconventional gas production to become the most rapidly 
expanding trend in onshore domestic fossil fuel exploration and production worldwide 
(Kargbo et al., 2010; Schlumberger, 2005; Vagnetti, 2009). 
In response to the shale gas boom in the US, the UK has seen the emergence of a 
nascent shale gas industry, though at the time of writing it remains at the exploration, rather 
than commercial production stage. Exploration companies such as Cuadrilla and iGas are 
focusing attention upon the Bowland-Hadder gas play running across central England from 
Cheshire to Yorkshire, and the Liassic shales of the Weald Basin in Southeast England 
(Schulz et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010), which a British Geological Survey report reveals an 
estimated yield of 20 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of recoverable methane (Andrews, 2013). 
Following this report the Coalition Government developed a policy framework in the 
Spending Round 2013 to stimulate shale gas investment: including industry tax incentives, a 
new regulatory framework and community benefits package for shale gas host communities 
(HM Treasury, 2013a), and 100% business rate recovery from fracking operations for local 
authorities (double the existing 50% rate), resulting in an estimated £1.7 million per annum 
for a typical shale gas site funded by central government (Prime Minister's Office, 2014). 
Together, these economic drivers reveal a policy platform described by Prime Minister David 
Cameron as “going all out for shale” (cited in Watt, 2014). This political rhetoric links to a 
practice of shale industry expansion throughout 2013 and 2014. Notable examples include 
Cuadrilla’s exploration activities in Balcombe, West Sussex; and iGas’s exploration in Barton 
Moss in Salford, Greater Manchester. Also at the time of writing in early 2014 there have 
been announcements that French multinational integrated oil and gas company Total 
confirmed a $48.1m (£29.3m) deal for a 40% share in shale gas exploration in the East 
Midlands (Gosden, 2014), showing signs of growing interest in commercial extraction 
activities.  
 
1.2. Environmental concerns in shale gas extraction 
Though profitability and incentivisation of shale gas extraction remain key UK Government 
policy priorities, the issue remains politically contentious due to significant environmental 
impacts. US experiences in the Barnett and Marcellus shale basins have been instrumental in 
shaping environmental concerns over shale gas globally. Following US reports of methane 
contaminating drinking water, such as those documented in the scientifically contentious 
2010 documentary Gasland, debate and localised protest have emerged in shale producing 
countries including France, Bulgaria and the UK (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Wood, 2012). 
Additionally, the carbon footprint of shale gas (Broderick et al., 2011) the threat of fugitive 
methane emissions (Howarth et al., 2011a), excessive water use, traffic congestion and light 
pollution from flares (Kargbo et al., 2010; Zobak et al., 2010), alongside the potential toxicity 
of fracturing fluids (Chen et al., 2014; Colborn et al., 2011), have exacerbated scientific 
concerns over negative climate impact, health, air quality, water use and the sustainability of 
shale-gas fuelled energy systems (Howarth et al., 2011b). In response to these concerns the 
Government task the Environment Agency (EA) with clear environmental permitting 
regulations.  Exploration and commercial shale gas producers must consult with the EA and 
apply for permits with regard to protecting water sources, such as groundwater (aquifers) and 
assessing and approving the use of hydraulic fracturing chemicals, the treatment and disposal 
of mining waste, and the treatment and management of naturally occurring radioactive 
materials (Environment Agency, 2014).  
One issue that has been prominent in UK shale gas debate is seismic activity resulting 
from fracking in 2011-12. In May 2011 the Government issued a suspension of drilling 
activities pending the investigation of two seismic tremors with magnitudes 2.3 and 1.5 
respectively following drilling in Weeton, Lancashire in Northwest England during fracking 
operations by Cuadrilla. However, following a range of BGS and industry prepared studies of 
the seismic risks (see for example Eisner et al., 2011; Green et al., 2012), the Government 
lifted restrictions on exploration activities in December 2012, leading to Cuadrilla and iGas’s 
exploration activities, both of which have triggered significant organised local protest (from 
organisations such as the No Fracking in Balcombe Society, and Frack Free Greater 
Manchester) and blocking of access to drilling sites. This in turn has stimulated simultaneous 
mobilisation of national anti-fracking campaigns from Greenpeace and other environmental 
NGOs, and activist organisations such as No Dash for Gas, and Frack Off. Together the local 
environmental risks (contaminated water, traffic, seismic activity) and global environmental 
risks (fugitive methane emissions and additional carbon dioxide sources) alongside local and 
national protest, have spurred a public debate on the social and environmental acceptability of 
the nascent shale gas industry. 
 
1.3. Social scientific research into shale gas development 
With growing opposition to shale gas activities a growing body of social scientific 
analysis is beginning to emerge. The effect of shale gas upon gas and electricity markets and 
broader energy policy in the United States, East Asia and Europe is now well documented 
(Asche et al., 2012; Gény, 2011; Hu and Xu, 2013; Jenner and Lamadrid, 2013; Kargbo et al., 
2010; Pearson et al., 2012; Rogers, 2011; Stevens, 2010; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2013; Wakamatsu and Kentaka, 2013). Moreover, issues of public 
acceptability, risk perception, policy governance and social impact in the Marcellus 
(Finewood and Stroup, 2012; Malin, 2013; Smith and Ferguson, 2013) and Barnett 
(Anderson and Theodori, 2009; Wynveen, 2011) is being explored; alongside consideration 
of global fracking movements, community engagement and public opposition to the siting of 
shale gas facilities (Boudet et al., 2014; Cotton, 2013; Jaspal et al., forthcoming; O'Hara et 
al., 2013; Theodori, 2009; Wood, 2012). Of particular interest to this study is Jaspal and 
Nerlich’s (2014) study of the threat dynamics of fracking reported in UK newspapers, and 
comparisons with this study are discussed in further detail in the results section of this paper. 
 
1.4. Shale gas as discourse 
The combination of central government rhetoric and growing grassroots activism, 
make shale gas a matter of public policy debate: a factor recognised by Prime Minister David 
Cameron (2013) in his op-ed in the Telegraph newspaper, stating: “Fracking has become a 
national debate in Britain – and it’s one that I’m determined to win.” Competitive debate over 
the social acceptability, environmental safety and economic viability of shale gas is drawing 
in a divergent range of stakeholders across industry, consultancy, NGO and activist 
organisations. The entanglement of divergent stakeholder interests reveals fault lines between 
competing world views, and an argumentative struggle amongst contested framings of the 
problem (see Bulkeley, 2000; Mander, 2008; Usher, 2013). This paper examines these issues 
through the lens of interpretive policy analysis, understanding public policy debate as a 
matter of discourse - referring to the ensembles of multiple understandings, framings and 
contexts that lead to the social construction of environmental problems by different actors 
(Hajer, 1993). The analysis of discourse encompasses what can and cannot be said about such 
problems in public dialogue, and by extension allows policy analysts to understand how the 
framing of energy policy problems and solutions through language can sustain or overturn 
dominant policy positions (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010).  
 
1.5. Argumentative discourse analysis of shale gas policy  
 Our empirical analysis uses an argumentative discourse analytic approach (hereafter 
ADAA) (Fischer, 1995; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Majone, 1989), which has previously 
proved valuable in uncovering the linguistic relationships embedded in numerous energy 
policy analyses; for example in relation to nuclear power, coal, onshore wind and solar 
energy (Bern and Winkel, 2013; Hunold and Leitner, 2011; Jessup, 2010; Mander, 2008; 
Szarka, 2004; Usher, 2013). The ADAA presents a framework for interrogating 
environmental discourses: heterogeneous and shared ways of apprehending the natural world 
which inherently draw out contestation for capturing the terms of environmental policy 
making (Dryzek, 1997). Litfin  (1995; 1994) suggests that discourses link actors together 
through their capacity to make authoritative claims about environmental decision-making 
based upon specialised knowledge – in essence discourses structure shared epistemic 
communities of actors and institutions and reveal the knowledge structures and power 
relations embedded in linguistic and interpretive practices, organisational strategies and 
contexts. Within these embedded epistemic communities, Dryzek’s (1997) emphasises the 
enabling potential of discourse for environmental policy, whereas Hajer’s (1995) ADAA 
contrasts by critically examining how human activity is shaped and constrained by discourse 
(see also Rydin, 2003). Policy discourses pull together a multitude of actors with their own 
legitimate perspectives and modes of talking or engaging in an issue, and the ADAA aims to 
uncover these relationships. 
 In practice, the ADAA draws out the embedded contextual factors in which policy 
strategies emerge by focusing upon the linguistic strategies that actors mobilise in public 
dialogue over environmental decision-making. The storyline is the central component. 
Storylines are narratives on social reality that play essential roles in the “clustering of 
knowledge, positioning of actors, and ultimately, in the creation of coalitions amongst the 
actors of a given domain” (Hajer, 1995). Each represents a fluid and context-based discursive 
formation by which actors publicly justify their claims. Storylines are characterised by 
specific emblems: issues that ‘dominate the perception of the ecological dilemma in a 
specified period’ (Hajer, 1995). Hajer states discourses are often fragmented and 
contradictory, with conflicts between various coalitions formed around a particular way of 
thinking about the environment. During environmental policy debates, coalitions are 
constructed to sustain a particular storyline. Although the actors in each coalition may share 
specific preferences, they often have their own particular interests and motivations (ibid. 
p.12). Hajer explains that “these coalitions are unconventional in the sense that the actors 
have not necessarily met, let alone that they follow a carefully laid out and agreed upon 
strategy” (ibid. p.13). Indeed, what gives discourse coalitions their power is that the actors 
group around particular storylines (even though they may interpret the meaning of these 
storyline differently).  
 Discourses are understood as reflecting the values and motivations of the coalition 
members. These actors can also draw upon different (sometimes conflicting) storylines, and 
hence can potentially move between discourse coalitions over time (Bulkeley, 2000); and the 
success of particular policy strategies can be understood in terms of the dominance, 
legitimisation and eﬀectiveness of particular storylines (Rydin, 2003). Because storylines do 
not necessarily adhere to specific political classes, parties or institutional settings, they can 
emerge across and between traditionally distinct political boundaries – linking diverse policy 
actors in capturing the terms of the debate and shaping institutional practices.  
 
2.1. Materials and methods 
 Empirical data collection follows a similar structure to that recommended by Hajer 
(1995): involving semi-structured interviews key actors in the shale gas policy (n=21, see 
Table 1 for organisational details of interviewees, note that individual organisations are not 
mentioned to preserve anonymity), collected using a purposive sampling method.  
 
Table 1 Organisational representation of interviewees 
Stakeholder organisation No. interviewees 
Energy consultancies 2 
Environmental non-governmental organisations 3 
Local/national activist groups 5 
Elected representatives/ local government officials 3 
Scientific and regulatory organisations (civil service/academia) 5 
Shale gas exploration/extraction companies 3 
 
 
 
Industry, local and national government representatives, energy consultants, national 
environmental NGOs, scientists, regulatory bodies, and local opposition groups were 
represented. The range of interviewees encompassed Hajer’s notion of capturing ‘helicopter’ 
perspectives across the policy domain (specialists with a broad overview of the issue), 
alongside others with specific interests in different policy outcomes. Thus, the range of 
interviewees were selected on the basis of an assumption that different organisations will ex 
ante adhere to different viewpoints, and hence present a suitable range of social analytic sites 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984) to encompass the range of competing storylines emerging in the 
policy domain. Interview data was supplemented by analysis of key actor responses to shale 
gas policy (in particular Government officials, industry representatives, national and local 
activists) found in UK broadsheet newspapers. Statements to newspapers act as key ‘sites of 
argumentation’ (Runhaar et al., 2006) to allow analysis of actor construction of storylines 
where interviews are not available, and revealing the development of storylines at different 
levels of policy governance (such as capturing senior politician responses). We examine 
articles drawn from a Nexis™ search (n=411 using the “shale gas” headline search, August 
2010 – January 2014 in the Guardian, Independent, The Times, Sunday Times, Telegraph, 
Sunday Telegraph, Observer). These were then mined for relevant quotes using computer 
aided qualitative data analysis software MaxQDATM, which were then coded in the same way 
as interview data.  
 An initial thematic analysis of the combined dataset using a bottom-up in vivo coding 
(see Glaser, 1992), followed similar lines to the Braun and Clarke (2006) methodology. 
Firstly we familiarised ourselves with the corpus of data from interview and newspaper 
quoted materials, generated a bottom-up coding template checked between the researchers. 
Storylines were identified by looking (for example) at where particular framing devices are 
used, such as metaphors drawn from a common conceptual domain (Larson, 2011; Núñez, 
2000), we then looked for specific discourse coalitions emerging. One means to do this was 
to look at where actors from different organisational backgrounds employed metaphors to 
describe facets of shale gas development from the same conceptual domain. We finally 
reviewed these relationships and used these as the basis for defining and labelling the 
storylines. 
 Three overarching storylines emerged. Each is given a label or moniker to encapsulate 
the substance of the issues presented. Discussion of the storylines draws upon the interview 
data and quoted materials from external sources; the aim is to present the storylines as 
coherent discursive formations and to discuss the policy implications of each. The final 
section of the paper discusses the coalitions of actors forming around these storylines and the 
implications of these for industry practices and policy developments emerging from the UK 
government in relation to shale gas. 
 
3.1 Results 
The three principal emergent storylines are discussed: 
1. Dirt and cleanliness – environmental impacts, risk communication and institutional 
trust 
2. Energy transitions – pathways and diversions – ecological modernisation, energy 
security and the role of fossil fuels in low carbon energy systems 
3. Geographies of environmental justice – situated actors, fairness and the politics of 
scale. 
 
3.2.1. Dirt and cleanliness 
3.2.1.1 Fossil fuels 
 The first key emergent storyline concerns shale gas as a representation of cleanliness 
or dirt. Common to the framing of the problem by stakeholders across the spectrum of pro 
and anti-shale gas organisations, are the descriptors “clean” and “clean-burning” contrasted 
with those of “dirty”, “toxic”, “messy” and “contaminating”. In each case the descriptor is 
comparative. Shale gas is defined in relation to other fuel sources: coal, tar sands, 
conventional oil, nuclear and renewables were key comparators identified across the range of 
interviewees. Cleanliness as an over-arching theme is defined in multiple ways; though the 
common thematic representation concerns the emission of carbon dioxide
 
(hereafter CO2) and 
other non-point source pollutants (defined as particulate ash, methane and sulphur) when 
compared with coal. Coal was universally construed as a “dirty” fuel by both shale gas 
industry interviewees, energy consultants, by local and national environmental activists, and 
scientists. Though all interviewees mentioned coal using negative descriptors (dirty), the 
inference was dependent upon which actors drew upon this metaphor. Industry and 
consultancy interviewees sought to bolster the environmental credibility of shale gas by 
positioning it as “cleaner than coal”, justified by evidence of lower particulate matter, sulphur 
and carbon dioxide emissions:  
 
Industry interviewee: simply put, the burning of the gas is a much cleaner carbon 
option, and in fact it’s one of the cleanest if not the cleanest of the carbon sources to 
get domestically. 
 
Interestingly this fossil fuel industry interviewee posits CO2 specifically as an unclean 
pollutant. A consistent challenge in the communication of climate change mitigation involves 
finding ways to overcome the relative socio-cultural invisibility of CO2 and the barriers this 
creates in visualising environmental change (see for example Whitmarsh et al., 2011). The 
concept of a “cleaner carbon option” reifies carbon as dirty and then discursively frames 
shale gas through a storyline of relative cleanliness in relation to different types and scales of 
emissions from coal. This utterance from a fossil fuel industry actor contrasts with some of 
the pro-shale gas social representations of threat revealed in Jaspal and Nerlich’s (2014) 
analysis of fracking in UK newspapers, whereby the ‘dirt’ storyline around fracking threats is 
countered in some newspapers (notably The Telegraph) by one of a green energy ‘threat’ to 
energy security. It is noteworthy that this framing of renewable energy was absent from our 
interview data.  
What is clear in the interview data, however, is that the ‘dirt’ storyline creates a 
discourse coalition of academic environmental scientists (in particular advocates of the 
Howarth et al., 2011a paper, that stimulated controversy over the climate impacts of fugitive 
methane emissions), environmental NGOs and protest organisations that seeks to shift the 
focus from particulate matter, sulphur and CO2 (the reasons why coal is considered dirty) 
towards attention to fugitive methane emissions. This counter-discourse coalition mirrors 
Jaspal and Nerlich’s (2014) findings, that shale gas is defined by shale gas opposition actors 
as dirty both in terms of higher methane emissions relative to coal (thus dirtier than coal, 
nuclear and tar sands which do not release methane) and higher CO2 in relative terms to 
renewable energy resources, pointing towards scientific uncertainty regarding the scale of 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and hence a precautionary approach to shale gas extraction: 
  
Labour party representative interviewee: “It’s even dirtier than tar sands, it causes 
methane to increase.” 
Green MP Caroline Lucas in the Guardian July 22, 2011: "It is deeply irresponsible to 
try to extract this gas. It is a dirty, dangerous and dodgy energy supply which is still 
not understood well enough."  
 
3.2.1.2 Risk visibility  
In addition to the cleanliness/dirtiness frame in terms of climate impacts, a second 
facet of the dichotomy concerns fracking chemicals, fugitive methane emissions and the 
potability of water. Water use is extensive in hydraulic fracturing, and the use of chemical 
additives is a significant cause for concern amongst local environmental groups opposed to 
shale gas exploration. Since 2011 there has been a discursive shift from the post-Gasland 
concern with drinking water contamination, and the post-Blackpool concern with earthquakes 
in UK newspaper reporting of the environmental issues. However, these localised 
environmental risks remain paramount to local activist organisations, such as the Residents 
Against Fylde Fracking (RAFF) and Ribble Estuary Against Fracking (REAF) groups 
interviewed. By contrast, it is clear that larger environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth have shifted towards discursively emphasising the climate change 
impacts in their opposition to shale gas development in energy policy. In framing and 
negotiating the local and global scales of environmental impacts, a number of sub-storylines 
emerge - relating to the conditions of uncertainty, risk visibility and institutional trust that 
surround industry environmental management practices.  
 
Activist interviewee: This [water used in fracking] is not sea water that they pump 
from the sea. This is not dirty water that they have got from streams or rivers. This is 
fresh clean water of drinking standard. Now that water is being pumped at high 
pressure underground, with toxic chemicals and with sand. They say the chemicals are 
to clean it but we don’t believe that. 
 
“Contamination” is a key descriptor used both by academic scientist and regulatory 
body interviewees as well as environmental activists. Contamination concerns not only the 
potential harm to health and wellbeing, but is framed as through the “toxic” (a word 
commonly mentioned within this discourse coalition) nature of the process as something that 
marks or despoils the environment and the communities affected. The contamination of water 
and the exacerbation of seismic activity are framed by these interviewee actors in terms of 
unknown risks (see Slovic, 1987) – whereby interviewee utterances emphasise that scientific 
uncertainty surrounds extraction techniques that are previously untested in the UK, and that 
scientific data on environmental impacts remain incomplete at the point where test drillings 
are taking place. Moreover, like CO2 emissions, the contamination of aquifers and the 
exacerbation of seismic activity provide socio-culturally invisible risks because they occur 
underground, are diffuse and beyond the direct perception of lay people (Beck, 1996), are 
spatially spread (uncertainty over where will be affected) and temporally delayed (when 
people will be affected). This creates concern amongst local activists, particularly when 
stretching risks across temporal horizons: 
 
Activist interviewee: In America they can’t find 3000 wells…. They’ve lost them. 
‘Cause you see when they finish they put a nice little piece of agricultural on top of 
the land so it looks all beautiful and finished… you can see farmland. What happens 
in 20 years when the cement fails, which it will. What happens under the ground, we 
can’t see? Just ‘cause we can’t see it, doesn’t mean it isn’t there. 
 
3.2.1.3 Bounded rationality and trust in fracking organisations  
The sociocultural invisibility of fracking risks means that their interpretation and 
negotiation is mediated through trust relationships with the both the private institutions 
involved in shale gas exploration (most notably Cuadrilla), but also public sector 
organisations charged with environmental protection and the governance of shale gas 
resources (e.g.the BGS, Environment Agency, Local Authorities, DECC, DEFRA, the Health 
and Safety Executive, Treasury etc. See Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Slovic, 1993; Wynne, 
2001 for further discussion of trust relationships). This is because, as Lidskog asserts, science 
does not produce an uncontested view on what constitutes acceptable invisible risks, and so 
managing them inevitably involves boundary work - the negotiation and demarcation of what 
is acceptable, legitimate and safe (Lidskog, 2008). Thus, like in the post-Gasland USA 
situation where shale industry organisations keenly disputed the scientific claims of the film, 
the interviewed shale gas supporters expressed environmental safety in unequivocal terms. 
The use of metaphors is key. Metaphors “function as a key framing device within a particular 
discourse over a certain period of time” (Zinken et al., 2008) which in turn create a certain 
organisation of human experiences, influencing the framing of approaches to difficult social 
and policy problems (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Núñez, 2000). In this case metaphors are 
used by pro-shale gas actors seeking to establish the boundaries of what constitutes legitimate 
public risk concerns; specifically through alluding to the bounded rationality of scientific 
knowledge (see for example Kahan et al., 2012) in comparison to supposedly ‘soft’ social and 
psychological factors that give rise to public fears over shale gas impacts. To give an 
example: 
 
Energy consultant interviewee: If we go with the various ones [environmental 
impacts] - Earthquakes I mean is completely inconsequential. Earthquake is a very 
scary sounding word - The difference between the earthquakes that have been caused 
in Blackpool and an earthquake that actually kills people. Is like the difference 
between a mild headache and a brain tumour. 
  
With regard to seismic risks, Cuadrilla have publicly declared their practices as ‘open 
and transparent’. Following the earthquakes near Blackpool and the temporary ban on 
exploration activities Cuadrilla commissioned a series of studies alongside the BGS to 
establish a scientific baseline of information upon which to structure a ‘traffic light’ detection 
system through a seismometer network around each of the wells. Continuing scientific 
assessment of seismic risks appears to have alleviated Government concerns (the ban was 
lifted directly following the BGS report), and so since November 2012, the emphasis upon 
seismic risks appears to have reduced in media reporting of shale gas, and in environmental 
NGO and activist framing of their opposition. Industry actors have been successful in 
institutionalising a discourse of an ‘acceptable’ level of seismic risk, and so challenges to 
shale gas policy and practices framed in seismic risk terms have had little effect on halting 
current and future shale gas developments. The risk acceptability of water contamination and 
chemical use has not yet been established, however, as one political party interviewee 
suggested, that: 
 
“…for commercial reasons, we’re not told what those [fracking] chemicals are, as it is 
commercially confidential; and thus we can’t know what it is, and what its life is in 
the ecosystem, what the potential health and environmental risks are, from those 
chemicals, and if you were to do an environmental impact assessment, it’s impossible 
without having that information. So we’re not being told enough by the people doing 
it. 
 
The community and activist-perceived lack of transparency exacerbates the socio-
cultural invisibility of fracking risks, and appears at odds with Cuadrilla’s CEO Francis 
Egan’s claim that the establishment of trust with communities comes down to 
“communication, communication, communication” (cited in Neate, 2013), akin to the deficit 
model that assumes that information provision in the public domain will promote the public 
acceptability of shale gas and organisational trust relationships with affected communities 
(Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1993); mirroring the response to protest amongst US shale 
gas industry organisations, which spent significant time and resources refuting the basic 
science presented in the Gasland film and establishing public relations mechanisms to refute 
claims of drinking water contamination. Yet as Wood (2012) and Cotton (2013) suggest, such 
practices misunderstand the motivations for activism – a social phenomenon driven not only 
by fears of visible risks like flammable drinking water, but also the types of economic 
development occurring in predominantly rural communities, and issues of place attachment 
and place identity when rural spaces become industrialised. As Jaspal et al. (forthcoming) 
have argued, shale gas presents profound opportunities and threats to human identity as 
environmental and place identity values conflict with desire for the local economic 
development in poor post-industrial and rural communities. Opposition to dirty shale gas thus 
concerns the threat of industry encroachment into rural places and the disruption this creates 
in the place identity of residents within affected areas (see for example Devine-Wright, 2005; 
Pasqualetti et al., 2002): 
Interviewer: Are there any other key issues you are concerned about? 
Activist interviewee: Well, the degradation of the countryside, the industrialisation of 
the countryside. There are countless lorries backwards and forwards. There are 
drilling rigs. There are fences, there are ditches. There are two huge tankers full of 
radioactive water, which maybe you don’t know about.  
In terms of place-identity effects, one significant concern is the threat of technological 
stigma that arises from industrial processes in rural environments. Traffic noise, air pollution, 
the visibility of drilling equipment, the flaring of methane, and light pollution surrounding 
drilling rigs were all mentioned by opposition group and environmental NGO interviewees. 
These impacts are not just pollutants in the sense of generating ecological and health risks; 
rather their significance lies in the change to the characteristics of affected places - rural 
places become transformed into industrial places, and in turn the local residents’ identity as 
rural people is altered, changing how they self-perceive their environment and how they are 
perceived by others outside their community (Broto et al., 2010; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 
2013; Devine-Wright and Howes, 2010; Gregory et al., 1995; Simmons and Walker, 2004). 
How these cultural and psychological dynamics from the encroachment of dirty extraction 
activities affect locally site communities is an issue worthy of further research, as Jaspal et al. 
(forthcoming) note. 
 
3.2.2. The significance of the dirt and cleanliness storyline  
The storyline of cleanliness, dirtiness, contamination and toxicity highlights two 
fundamental aspects of discourse. On one level “dirt” is used as a framing effect that links 
interviewee’s mental representations of shale gas pollution to the choice of language used in 
public communication. The alternate sub-storylines of cleanliness/dirtiness are emphasis 
frames which are reference dependent (see in particular Druckman, 2001). The 
communication of individuals’ perception of reality shifts by focusing on a subset of the 
relevant aspects of pollution (i.e. CO2 or methane). This creates a narrative which aims to 
encourage others to interpret information about pollution in certain ways and not others. In 
essence the emphasis frame (clean or dirty) aims to be persuasive, trying to assert the 
legitimacy of one discursive framing over the other and thus establish the legitimacy of the 
discourse coalition.  
On a second, deeper level, we can see the dirt/cleanliness narrative as emblematic of 
an environmental problematique (Hajer, 1995), in the sense that it reflects the social 
processes of ordering society and the moral dimensions of national energy policy. Following 
Douglas (1966) (and more recently Nash, 2008), the cleanliness of shale gas can be 
understood not as an absolute measure based upon scales and types of pollutants, or 
quantitative measuring of social and environmental impacts or a metric of scientific 
demarcation of safe from unsafe. Rather the technical aspects of risk management are 
subsumed into an emergent discourse of defining ethical responsibility for shale gas resources 
and the spatio-temporal ordering of matter. Douglas construes dirt as matter out of place, 
which can be understood in three ways: firstly, as carbon and particulate matter released into 
the atmosphere rather than locked away geologically in fossil fuels; secondly, as chemicals 
deposited underground and earth tremors in seismically inactive places; and thirdly of lorries, 
gas flares, drilling equipment and other industrial devices in the rural countryside. Shale 
supporters employ cleanliness metaphors to establish the ethical responsibility for energy 
industries to promote lower carbon electricity and heating solutions in an energy-thirsty and 
climate change-threatened world (and as Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014 show, the concept of 
'threat' is used by both shale gas supporters and opponents to bolster the rationalitiy of their 
positions witihn the debate); whereas opponents of shale gas development employ dirt 
metaphors to establish the irresponsibility of adding new carbon and methane sources to the 
climate system in places which would be irrevocably changed by industrialisation processes. 
At the current stage of shale gas policy development in the UK, it is clear that 
Government policy initiatives have sought to exclude this contentious storyline, it appears to 
its emblematic representation of climate change as it relates to energy policy. The UK’s 
commitment to meeting legally binding CO2 reduction targets under the Climate Change Act 
2008 and the concomitant effort to establish renewable and other low carbon energy sources 
is challenged by shale gas’s potential to ensure short term energy security, plugging a 
growing energy gap between growing demand and declining nuclear and fossil fuel 
resources. So although the competing discourse coalitions of industry and activists construe 
the problem in terms of GHGs and other pollutants, Government has remained virtually silent 
on this issue. In Government press releases, statements by David Cameron and George 
Osborne etc. and in the practices of tax incentivisation for shale exploration companies and 
local authorities to accept shale gas exploration, it is clear that there is unequivocal support 
from central Government to the shale industry. What we see is that the issue of environmental 
impacts is framed in government policy discourse as something that can be managed. It is 
principally framed as a matter of strict regulatory control following the Government’s 
acceptance of the Royal Academy of Engineering report that states that “the health, safety 
and environmental risks can be managed effectively in the UK. Operational best practices 
must be implemented and enforced through strong regulation” (Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2012). Thus the cleanliness storyline has had little effect on central Government 
policy formation, with Government actors shifting emphasis away from the controversial 
issue of climate change towards a second, (currently dominant) storyline concerning the 
temporal and geographic scales of energy transition and the policy measures around 
economic investment.   
 
3.3.1. Energy transitions 
3.1.1.1. Pathways and diversions 
The second key emergent storyline concerns the concept of ‘transitions’ as means to 
frame the transformation of energy systems in light of climate change, energy security 
“threats” (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014), national economic recovery and the alleviation of fuel 
poverty. In understanding shale gas in the context of transitions, like before, it is important to 
note the choice of metaphors used, and the conceptual domain from which they are drawn 
(Larson, 2011). Bridge et al. (2013) argue that the language of energy transitions is 
commonly framed in the context of socio-technical systems. Terms like niche, regime and 
landscape provide a contextual account of technological change and system innovations over 
time (such as why certain niches evolve or are incorporated into regimes while others are 
not). These metaphors are drawn from a linguistic source domain of geographic terminology, 
and socially construct energy in spatio-temporal terms. What we find in the interviewee 
responses is a related geographic-metaphorical language used to describe shale gas 
transitions, which like the clean/dirty storyline, is dichotomised between two competing 
discourse coalitions.  
Firstly, the language of transition pathways was frequently evoked by interviewees 
from both industry and activist organisations. In the academic and policy literatures, it is 
posited that different assemblages of technologies, fuel sources, policies and communities of 
practice co-evolve to produce multiple “pathways” through which to achieve the 
decarbonisation and decentralisation of energy systems (Foxon, 2013). With regards to the 
framing of shale gas within this storyline, again the choice of metaphor is important in 
defining opposing discourse coalitions. One coalition formed of (for example) policy actors 
in DECC, and evident in industry and consultancy organisation interviews, principally adopt 
what could be terms a pragmatic position regarding shale gas development. These actors 
universally adopted the language of “bridges” and “pathways”, geographic metaphors that 
imply visible and coherent transition management, allowing continued economic dependence 
on fossil fuels, whilst reducing GHG emissions when compared to coal or oil (Arthur et al., 
2009; DECC, 2009); an issues which remains controversial, with concerns that the language 
of bridge fuels belies the carbon intensity of these gas sources (Stephenson et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless it is the relative transience of shale gas as part of the “energy mix” (Cameron, 
2013), that has become the dominant storyline. By contrast, and in a manner that mirrors 
Jaspal and Nerlich’s (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014) study of threat dynamics, is that activists 
from Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and local opposition groups have sought to overturn 
the competing storyline by using competing geographic metaphors from the same source 
domain, describing shale gas as a “diversion”, “distraction” or “block”. For example: 
 
Environmental NGO interviewee: We see it as being not a destination fuel; it’s not 
really even a transition fuel. It’s probably more of a dangerous diversion we think for 
the UK mainly because of its climate change impacts. 
 
National opposition organisation interviewee: …there’s talk about fracking being a 
bridge between dirty energy and clean energy and that’s not really the case. In fact 
fracking is a block between that transition because we’re keeping the price of energy 
and undermining the energy source which we should really be using [implying 
renewables].  
 
There was significant consensus amongst both activist and industry respondents that 
the business-as-usual conventional fossil fuels sources were unsustainable in light of 
declining North Sea oil and gas reserves. However discursive divergence hinges upon the role 
of shale gas in meeting the legal obligations of the Climate Change Act 2008. With the 
emphasis on security of energy supply, there was expressed concern from NGO and activist 
respondents that this would hamper efforts to establish a market presence for renewables 
industries. The competing discourse coalition could be described as a contrasting idealist 
position, grounded in a moral stance on absolute CO2 reduction to mitigate climate change, 
described as the “prism”, as one environmental NGO interviewee termed it, through which 
shale gas was viewed.  
 
3.3.1.2 Economic viability of shale gas 
The transition discourse not only concerns CO2, but also the economic viability of 
shale extraction in the UK context. No consensus emerged on this topic, even within the 
discourse coalition of academic, consultant and industry interviewees. An academic 
petroleum geologist described shale gas unviable due to “plummeting gas prices” in the US 
due to a system of individual land rights, whereby investment in shale gas rich regions 
requires the bulk purchase of individual licences with a legal requirement to drill within 3 
years, encouraging mass drilling and market saturation. A UK industry interviewee framed 
the US case differently, suggesting it as an example of economic viability, because gas prices 
in Europe are much higher, and so increasing gas availability would make such a proposition 
viable. Industry and consultancy interviewees consistently drew upon a discourse of 
ecological modernisation; positing shale gas as the means to achieve economic growth and 
industrial development in a manner that provides net environmental benefits from coal 
reduction, thus positing that shale gas produces a win-win scenario of 
environmental productivity (Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1995). This discourse is drawn upon in 
the highest levels of UK Government, whereby key politicians including the Prime Minister 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer emphasise global competitiveness as a motivation for shale 
gas expansion in the context of an age of austerity. As David Cameron states (2013): 
“Without it, we could lose ground in the tough global race.” Or George Osborne (cited in 
Macalister and Harvey, 2013): “I want Britain to be a leader of the shale gas revolution - 
because it has the potential to create thousands of jobs and keep energy bills low for millions 
of people.”  
 
3.3.2. The significance of the energy transitions storyline 
In practice, the storyline manifests through Government policy designed to stimulate 
shale gas investment and market uptake, using ‘supply-push’ and ‘demand pull’ strategies 
(Loiter and Norberg-Bohm, 1999) announced in the 2013 Spending Round (HM Treasury, 
2013b) and in the January 2014 announcement on local council business rate incentives 
mentioned above. Supply-push encourages development though tax incentives. The proposed 
‘pad allowance’ exempts a portion of production income from supplementary charges – 
reducing the effective tax rate from 62% per cent to 30% at current tax rates, which is 
expected to stimulate up to £14 billion of investment in 2013 (HM Treasury, 2013a). 
Demand-pull is defined by regulatory and social benefit mechanisms to improve the uptake 
within the market, such as the proposed incentive package whereby operators provide at least 
£100,000 of benefits per well site to host communities during the exploration phase, followed 
by a share of at least 1% of overall revenues. DECC states that companies have also pledged 
to engage with communities early, prior to applications for planning permission (DECC, 
2013), thus ensuring local involvement in environmental planning. The two policy 
mechanisms of supply push to the shale industry and demand pull to both local councils and 
affected site communities to consent to shale extraction in exchange for economic incentives 
therefore link a storyline of economic development in response to global competition and 
energy security, with the economic geographies of shale gas development as a matter of 
procedural and distributive environmental justice.  
 
3.4.1. Geographies of environmental justice  
There are two elements of environmental justice that relate to emergent shale gas 
policy in England and Wales. The first concerns the procedural aspect of justice, essentially 
the fairness through which the distribution of environmental risks and benefits occurs and the 
possibilities which individuals and communities have to avoid or ameliorate fracking risks, 
whilst maintaining visual and other amenity values, access to environmental resources and 
ecosystem services (Lawrence et al., 1997; Walker, 2009). The second refers to the 
distributive justice. This concerns the equitable distribution of environmental risks weighed 
against social and material benefits. Distributive injustice occurs when risk burdens fall upon 
populations predominantly composed of black people, migrant workers and the working poor 
alongside other socio-economically marginalised groups that are bounded by proximity to 
environmentally polluting sites, and benefits are felt by broader populations beyond the 
proximity of the immediate risk burden (Agyeman and Evans, 2004; Kaswan, 2002; 
Schlosberg, 2007; Walker et al., 2005).   
 
3.4.1.1 Procedural justice 
The procedural justice aspect of the environmental justice discourse relates 
specifically to community engagement and community benefit practices, which have proved 
deeply controversial for locally affected site communities. When Cuadrilla began exploration 
activities in Lancashire they obtained permitted site licences that did not require 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Part 2(d) of Schedule I of the Town and Country 
Planning Regulations 1999 in England and Wales regarding Environmental Impact 
Assessment relating to extractive industries advises a screening opinion to be required where 
the proposed area of any works would exceed 1ha. However, as Kotakis (2012) notes, the 
proposed operations by Cuadrilla did not fall under Schedule I as they were exploratory and 
not commercial, and not large enough to constitute Schedule II developments either as they 
were all declared as covering an area of 0.99 hectares. Thus, although Cuadrilla’s 
environmental management practices represent compliance with the legal regulatory 
framework, they raise significant challenges to social acceptability of operations, and by 
extension trust in the organisation. Its actions were described by one environmental NGO 
interviewee as:  
“Incredibly unwise because I think it made the industry look like they had something 
 to hide”. 
By sidestepping EIA, Cuadrilla’s actual environmental planning practices failed to 
establish what could be termed a social licence to operate (SLO), essentially a psychological 
contract that produces an ongoing status of local stakeholder approval. SLO extends beyond 
what is considered to be normal business practice or courtesy to ensure a feeling of security, 
and is based on a notion of a diffuse, generalised obligation of reciprocity and exchange 
(Kleinrichert, 2008). SLO is significant because acting contrary to community expectations 
may have unintended consequences for the industry (Howard-Grenville et al., 2008), which 
can include project opposition as well as tightening of regulatory conditions (Gunningham et 
al., 2004) as regulatory authorities are pressured by elected representatives to bridge the 
social licence gap with legislative instruments of environmental control. Community 
engagement in decision-making over site licensing is a key aspect of gaining SLO and thus 
establishing procedural fairness (see for example Gross, 2007); and failure to establish this 
intangible agreement can result in place-based communities around development sites 
becoming sites of political contestation (Calvano, 2008).  
The participatory processes inherent to EIA are lauded as a means to achieve 
procedural fairness (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; Hartley and Wood, 2005) and establish social 
licence. Though Cuadrilla espouse the aforementioned “communication, communication, 
communication” rhetoric, it is clear that amongst locally affected site communities in 
Lancashire and Suffolk concerns remain that Caudrilla’s practices remain a form of 
deliberative speak (Hindmarsh and Matthews, 2008) - a rhetoric of engagement that is not 
matched by mechanisms to ensure community involvement in decisions, and thus fail to 
secure social license. As one activist states: 
Local activist interviewee: I just think the whole thing is just unfair. And Cuadrilla 
will come and do big public presentations and they talk about engaging with the 
community. Excuse me what you’ve done, you’ve bunged a couple of hundred quid 
for somebody to buy some flowers to go outside a village hall somewhere; that is not 
engaging with the community. So it is that lack of legitimacy that fires me up and 
inspires me to give up my time for [local activist organisation]. 
It is not only the exploration companies that come under scrutiny however, as there is 
growing concern that as local authorities will receive cash incentives in the form of 100% 
business rates for shale extraction activities, that this will damage the impartiality and 
procedural environmental justice capabilities of councils to protect vulnerable constituencies. 
As Barbara Keeley, Labour MP for Worsley and Eccles South in Greater Manchester stated 
in the Guardian (cited in Vaughan, 2014):  
 
To me, it [100% business rates] muddies the water to give councils two contradictory 
roles. One is a protective role, to check companies have safeguards. On the other 
hand, you have a cash-strapped authority that's lost £100m off its budget, like ours, 
that gets offered this cash incentive in business rates. The public involved in this, who 
live near the site, how can they trust the local council will make the right decision on 
this? 
 
Together these utterances represent concern with an emergent discourse of trust and 
environmental justice that stretches local concerns for procedural fairness across multiple 
geographic and governance scales; linking local places and local authorities with national 
energy policy institutions in Westminster and Whitehall. This has analogues in the USA, for 
example Smith and Ferguson (2013) studied political activity in relation to the Marcellus 
shale, showing how different actors across competing discourse coalitions argued that 
different levels of government policy making – local, state, and federal – should be the locus 
of policy decisions, generating new and subtle forms of political controversy around the 
scales at which decision-points are made and then contested. In the UK case, we see that 
contested scales of fracking adopt this governance dimension as local authorities’ impartiality 
to protect publics from locally unwanted shale exploration is contested by a central 
government policy platform that may produce unintended effects such as peripheralisation 
(Blowers and Leroy, 1994) of cash-poor communities, whereby local authority support for 
the industry becomes increasingly framed as a solution to existing economic deprivation 
(Walker et al., 2005); in essence producing a form of economic coercion. 
 
3.4.1.2 Distributive justice  
The issues of procedural fairness are exacerbated by controversy surrounding the 
geographic distribution of benefits and harms, particularly across national scales. Concerns 
have been raised amongst interviewees and politicians in the national press around a growing 
North-South divide in the implementation of shale gas extraction practices. Conservative peer 
and former Energy Secretary Lord Howell’s comments in the House of Lords in August 
2013, positioned shale gas as suitable for “desolate” regions that he described as "unloved 
places that are not environmentally sensitive". The implication being, that Preese Hall in 
Lancashire (and by extension Barton Moss in Salford) are suitable for fracking, whilst 
Balcombe in West Sussex is not. By alluding to a lack of aesthetic (and hence amenity) value 
in the Northwest of England (Lord Howell also erroneously referred to it as affecting the 
Northeast of England) an issue of distributive environmental justice emerges. Though the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government sought to distance themselves 
from Lord Howell’s comments, extraction in Balcombe brought this environmental justice 
storyline to the forefront of media reporting and national political debate, and it is noteworthy 
that some industry actors have spoken in support of this framing. For instance, Neill O’Brien 
the head of shale gas exploration company Alkane Energy was quoted in The Times calling 
for the "traditional heartlands" of the Midlands and the North to be fracked before the 
Southeast, in order to save the industry from “becoming bogged down by a storm of protests 
in rural areas like Balcombe in Sussex” (cited in Webb, 2013). The emergent storyline 
involves complex spatial and scalar dimensions of environmental justice, and if it becomes 
dominant in shale gas policy then the environmental risks borne by areas of low visual 
amenity will be higher than those in areas of high visual amenity. The distribution of risk 
could therefore be based upon an arbitrary system whereby some place identities are valued 
higher than others (see in particular Walker, 2009). In 2011 economically marginalised areas 
in Lancashire (such as those close to Blackpool) were chosen as fracking sites. It is unclear 
what technical criteria are used for site selection within shale basins; but within the political 
discourse it appears that places like Preese Hall may become targets based upon the relative 
economic marginalisation of citizens and hence the peripherality (Blowers and Leroy, 1994) 
of affected communities within these regions.  
Eric Ollerenshaw, MP for Lancaster and Fleetwood, goes further to suggest that a 
North-South divide is emerging in fracking politics, whereby Lancashire becomes the UK’s 
“energy base”, and “the North gets the dirty end and the South sucks up all the energy” (cited 
in Weston, 2013). The issues of where shale gas exploration should occur within shale basins, 
is thus a matter not only of the micro-politics of siting between developer and locally affected 
communities (often labelled by developers as a so-called Not-in-my-back-yard or NIMBY 
problem, see Burningham, 2000), but also concerns the scale at which political discourse is 
negotiated. Activists and protest organisations in Preese Hall, Balcombe and Barton Moss 
involve amalgamations of local and national protest organisations – a strategy for such 
organisations to “jump scales” (Smith, 1984), i.e. engage in practices that signal how politics 
are spatialised across multiple geographic and political governance scales that are enacted as 
means for dominant organisations to disempower Northern English communities, and for 
activists to become empowered in national discourse (see for example Swyngedouw, 2004). 
This issue of jumping scales has stimulated commentary from newspapers such as The 
Telegraph, which have run editorials that emphasis how that certain activists involved in 
protests in Barton Moss “have no connection to the area”, but are rather “militant 
activists…portraying themselves as representing local opinion” (Sawer, 2013) implying that 
grassroots activism provides legitimate grounds for protest, whereas as national movement of 
activists to sites of protest does not. This issue is strongly rebutted by No Dash For Gas, who 
argue that Sawer employs the language of ‘outsiders’ parachuting in and not taking local 
issues and needs into account as a discursive strategy that “perniciously uses xenophobic 
connotations around ‘foreigners’ and ‘outsiders’ who seemingly have no place in one which 
is not ‘their own’ to justify this position.” (No Dash For Gas, 2013). 
 
3.4.2. The significance of the geographies of environmental justice storyline  
 
The issue of spatiality in shale gas is a key factor in determining how political conflict 
at fracking sites has become part of a national discourse concerning how certain places and 
certain communities become targeted and others are not. In practice it appears that the 
outcome of powerful interests in the Conservative Party and shale gas exploration companies 
“jumping scales”, is that political support from Westminster for siting in the Northwest of 
England will be greater than in the Southeast, because of a discursive formulation of “dirty” 
industries being appropriate for “desolate” places. Within this discourse of scalar politics the 
North of England is posited as being remote from London politics, and thus less of a threat. 
Brenda Pollack of Friends of the Earth in the Guardian newspaper states: "Drilling in the 
home counties brings the threat of fracking geographically and politically closer to 
Westminster” (Booth, 2013). The conception of place value to powerful interests in the shale 
gas industry have created generated a storyline that potentially splits shale gas opposition into 
two geographically situated discourse coalitions operating at multiple geographic scales, 
concerned not only with local environmental protection but in countering a North-South 
divide within a national energy policy framework. Therefore, although the Government was 
quick to distance itself from Lord Howell’s comments, and to emphasise both the strict 
regulatory environment that reduces environmental and amenity value impacts and ensure 
early community engagement; from interviewee responses this is clearly not experienced by 
concerned residents in affected local communities, requiring further empirical exploration not 
only of public perceptions of shale gas extraction risks, but also the distributive and 
procedural justice dimensions of energy policy frameworks, alongside examination of the 
scalar politics of place-identity and place-attachment related values in affected rural, peri-
urban and urban communities when national activist organisations support and (it could be 
argued, discursively override) the positions of local community activists both within shale 
gas basins and in communities not currently affected by exploration activities.  
 
4.1. Discussion  
What is perhaps unsurprising about emerging storylines around shale gas 
development are the formation of competing framings of the issue that divide predominantly 
into two distinct discourse coalitions. As in Jessup’s (2010) paper on wind energy discourse 
coalitions, the storylines are summarised and organisation membership of attendant discourse 
coalitions in shown in Table 2.  
  
Table 2 Storylines and associated discourse coalitions 
Overarching 
storyline 
Principal values and 
worldviews 
Contrasting discourse 
coalition memberships 
Other actors 
involved in the 
storyline 
Cleanliness 
and dirt 
Cleanliness as an organising 
principle, defined 
relationally. Characterised by 
comparative assessment of 
environmental benefits and 
harms in relation either to 
coal/tar sands/nuclear or to 
renewables. Social 
construction of cleanliness as 
relative reduction in carbon 
dioxide, and particulate ash in 
relation to coal. Social 
construction of dirt as an 
absolute increase in methane, 
and a relative increase in 
carbon dioxide in relation to 
renewables. Dirt storyline 
compounded by both the 
invisibility of fracking risks - 
toxicity, water contamination 
and the visibility of 
industrialising rural places.  
Shale exploration 
companies, energy 
consultancy, academic 
environmental 
scientists and 
geophysicists, HM 
Treasury (cleanliness) 
 
Contrasted with: 
 
Environmental NGOs, 
Green Party, local and 
national activist 
organisations (dirt) 
Environment 
Agency, DECC, 
DEFRA, HSE 
BGS (regulation, 
scientific 
assessment and 
environmental 
protection) 
Renewable energy 
companies 
Fossil fuel 
companies (Shell, 
BP etc.) 
 
Pathways and 
bridges 
Development of shale gas 
defined through temporal and 
spatial metaphors of 
transition, paths, roads, 
bridges and blockages. 
Discursive conflict between 
shale gas as a pragmatic 
position “a stop-gap” as 
society shifts from reliance 
on fossil fuels to lower 
carbon alternatives, and the 
idealist positions of it as a 
“dangerous distraction” in the 
face of the threat of climate 
change. Economic viability is 
variably defined in relation to 
the United States experience 
– either as viable (it can 
provide domestic energy 
security and reduce domestic 
gas prices) or unviable 
(market gas prices have 
fallen). 
Shale gas exploration 
companies, larger 
fossil fuel extraction 
companies, HM 
Treasury, 
Conservative Party 
within Coalition 
Government, David 
Cameron and George 
Osborne (transition) 
 
Contrasted with: 
 
Frack Off, No Dash 
for Gas, Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, 
local activist 
organisations 
(blockage)  
 
Energy 
consultants 
Banks and shale 
gas investment 
institutions 
Local councils 
 
Geographies of 
environmental 
justice 
Defined in relation to 
procedural and distributive 
fairness aspects across 
geographical scales.  
Discursive conflict between 
supporters claiming 
transparent communication 
strategies and low 
environmental risks, versus 
actors concerned with 
inadequate community 
engagement, siting based 
upon arbitrary place 
valuation, and the 
peripheralisation of 
politically vulnerable 
communities in the North of 
England. 
HM Treasury, 
industry, Conservative 
party (central 
government), DECC, 
DEFRA 
 
Contrasted with: 
 
Conservative and 
Labour (local 
government and MPs 
in affected 
constituencies), Frack 
Off, local activist 
organisations 
RSPB 
Environment 
Agency 
County councils 
Councillors and 
with constituents 
in affected areas 
 
It must be noted that such coalitions are neither definitive, nor complete – the fluidity 
and context sensitivity of discourse coalitions means that actors and institutions can move 
within and between storylines and so discourse coalitions shift and re-emerge in different 
configurations. To simplify, however, it is clear that on one side Government and industry 
interests emerge, which are contrasted with environmental NGOs, local and national activist 
organisations. The former seek to establish the rationality of shale exploration on pragmatic 
grounds of ensuring energy security and affordability in a manner that produces less climate 
change inducing carbon pollutants than alternatives such as coal, whilst trying to establish 
social acceptability through compensation/community benefits, clearer regulatory structures 
and communicative engagement with local communities. The emphasis of the second 
storyline on transitions, economic incentivisation, profitability and hence ecological 
modernisation is clearly espoused by this coalition. In contrast the competing coalition 
emphasises the idealistic and ethical stance that the goal of total emissions reduction is not 
satisfied by shale gas expansion, that unknown risks, visible intrusions into rural places and a 
lack of local community decision-making involvement make place-protective actions such as 
those seen in Balcombe and Barton Moss the only effective political solution in halting 
current and future development activities. Though the emergence of these dichotomised 
discourse coalitions is unremarkable, given the prevalence of social movements emerging in 
relation to polluting industries, what is important to note is the shared framing of shale gas in 
terms of shared metaphors of environmental, social and economic development across these 
two coalitions, and how the spatiality of localised fracking created new coalitions between 
actors which make ‘strange bedfellows’ (see for example Szarka, 2004). Notably as Neate 
(2013) suggests: “[fracking is] a highly emotive subject that has galvanised opinions across 
the political and environmental spectrum and threatens to align some of the highest ranking 
members of the Tory party with a new generation of eco-warriors.” 
 
5.1. Conclusions and policy implications 
It is important to contextualise emerging developments in UK shale gas policy in light 
of these storylines, and to ascertain future policy directions that are implicated by the 
capacity of policy actors to capture the terms of the debate and assert their specific world 
views in shaping shale gas outcomes. The rapid policy response to shale gas within central 
government following the ‘all clear’ from the BGS on seismic risks and from the Royal 
Academy of Engineering on environmental pollution, shows that the Government prioritises 
the economic development potential of shale gas over the potential climate change impacts 
raised by national NGOs, and the localised disruptions, adverse health, air and water quality, 
place identity and place attachment effects raised by local activists, community members and 
academic scientists operating within that discourse coalition. The Government’s policy 
practices exclude the cleanliness/dirt storyline almost entirely, emphasising that negative 
local environmental effects can be managed through regulation, and that opposition can be 
alleviated through upstream industry consultation (despite complaints from local 
communities over lack of decisional influence) and through economic incentivisation through 
profit sharing and benefits packages, both for locally affected site communities and for 
supportive local authorities.  
In terms of the most pressing environmental issue of climate change, it is clear that 
there is both rhetorical and practical distinction between shale gas and climate change 
mitigation policy platforms. Climate change is very rarely mentioned in shale gas policy 
documentation, or in political statements from cabinet members. Also of significance is the 
lack of consideration over the rebound effects of shale gas on the comparator ‘dirty’ fuels – 
such as the influence of low gas prices on decreased in coal use in the United States, leading 
to oversupply of coal in Europe and a significant gas-to-coal switching in European energy 
markets (International Energy Agency, 2013). This is a significant issue that has already led 
to increased atmospheric levels of sulphur and nitrogen oxides and small particles within the 
UK as  the amount of coal burnt has increased (Environment Agency, 2013), and links UK 
energy futures with climate mitigation, as the total impact of shale gas on GHG emission 
reduction targets is not satisfactorily addressed in current policy. Moreover the economic 
concerns over profitability, skills shortages and unfavourable market conditions raised both in 
independent economic reports (mentioned above) and by energy consultancy and academic 
interviewees in this study remain largely unaddressed. In short, though empirical data 
collection reveals the different typologies of perspectives emerging across industry, 
academic, local political and activist actors and organisations, these storylines have had little 
influence upon the development of current UK shale gas policy. The dominant storyline 
within central Government concerns global competitiveness, energy security and profitability 
- overriding not only activist concerns with environmental impacts, climate ethics, procedural 
justice and renewable energy development, but also framing shale gas more and more as a 
destination, rather than transition fuel. Thus a clear distinction emerges between the divergent 
stakeholder representations of shale gas evident in these emergent storylines and the policy 
platform espoused by Government. In essence this discursive divergence will likely 
exacerbate protest actions across multiple governance and geographic scales, as these myriad 
stakeholder actors attempt to reassert the dominance of their competing storylines in shaping 
policy outcomes, and the dynamics of this political struggle are worthy of further empirical 
analysis. 
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